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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

MAURIA T. TANNER (SWENSEN),

]I

REPLY TO APPELLEE'S RESPONSE

Plaintiff and Appellant, ]
v.

]

JAMES G. SWENSEN, JR.,

]
I

Civil Case No. 924901803DA
Appellate Case No. 940079-CA

Defendant and Appellee.

RULE 9 (C)(2)A; JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
This appeal is authorized under Utah Code Annotated, sec. 782-2 (3)(j), and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 which indicates
a procedure for taking appeals from judgments and order of trial
courts. This brief follows the structural requirements outlined in
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. This is an appeal
by Mauria T. Tanner (Swensen), Plaintiff, from a judgment and
Decree of Divorce.
RULE 9(C)(3): NATURE OF PRECEDENCE
This appeal is from a trial of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before the
Honorable Dennis Frederick, without a jury. The final orders were
Amended Decree Of Divorce and Amended Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions of Law.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the division of the marital property was

equitable.
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding

alimony of $700 per month for a two-year period.
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imputing

income from Tanner, Inc., as well as income from teaching Art
classes in the past during the summer, for purposes of child
support and alimony.
4.

Whether the trial court abused it's discretion in using

Ms. Tanner's interest in Tanner, Inc., in figuring child support
and/or alimony.
5.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding

that Ms. Tanner has the future capacity to earn $20,000 a year in
approximately two years.
6.

Whether the court abused its discretion in not awarding

attorney's fees.
7.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in not

allowing Plaintiff's counsel to present a

closing argument.

RULE 9(C)4: STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts which are material to the questions presented on
this appeal are as follows:
Reply to Appellee Response
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1.

The parties had a long-term marriage, approximately 19

years. They were married on the 22nd day of November, 1974, in Salt
Lake City, Utah. (Record at 23, line 15)
2.

The parties have four children. (Record at 21, line 13)

3.

Mauria Tanner worked to help James Swensen, Jr. obtain

two separate graduate degrees. (Record at 23, lines 18-25, Record
at 24, line 1-6)
4.

James Swensen, Jr., is currently a tax attorney as well

as a Certified Public Accountant with a Masters Degree in
Accountancy. (Record at 23 & 24)
5.

Ms. Tanner has recently begun a graduate program which

should be completed within two years with a Masters Degree in
Expressive Therapy from the University of Utah. (Record 23, lines
1-10)
6.

Ms. Tanner testified that in two years, she is hopeful

that she might earn up to $20,000 a year. (Record at 94, lines 2-4)
7.

Mr. Swensen's projected annual income for the year of

1993 was $67,500 (Defendant's Exhibit 2, page 0000043)
8.

Ms. Tanner has, in the past, earned approximately $1,500

a year for teaching Art in the summer time; however, she is not
planning to continue this seasonal job as a result of her yearReply to Appellee Response
Appellate Case. No. 940079-CA
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round school obligation. (Transcript of Judge's Ruling, page 3,
line 19)
9.

Ms. Tanner owes her Father $3,000, of which $2,000 went

to Attorney's fees. (Record 35, lines 13-18)
10.

Ms. Tanner paid just under $5,000 for Attorney's fees

just prior to the loan from her Father. (Record at 35, lines 16-18)
11.

Ms. Tanner owed approximately $12,000 to law offices of

present counsel. (Record 36, lines 17-20)
12.

Ms. Tanner's lifestyle significantly altered since the

separation. (Record at 39, lines 5-20)
13.

The Tanner Corporation made disbursements for the purpose

of paying the personal taxes of the parties. (Record at 48, lines
3-3)
14.

Ms. Tanner had no control over any of the IRA's ,

retirement accounts, savings accounts, or other significant marital
assets during separation - making no withdrawals from any of these
accounts. (Record at 51, lines 23-25, Record at 52, lines 5-6)
15.

Ms. Tanner never gave her permission to use or withdraw

marital funds. (Record at 55, lines 1-2)
16.

Mr. Swensen withdrew significant amounts from the marital

IRA accounts during the separation. (Record at 53, lines 14-19)
17.

Defendant/Appellee, James Swensen gave himself zero value
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for furniture, he has in his possession, although he admits taking
marital property. (Record at 152, lines 1-25, record at 153, lines
1-4, record 155, lines 1-25, and record at 156, lines 1-25)
18.

Defendant/Appellee, James Swensen paid his personal legal

fees from marital funds during the separation. (Record at 164,
lines 11-15)
19.

Defendant/Appellee, James Swensen used marital funds to

pay off his student loans in the approximate amount of $10,996.
(Record at 168, lines 2-25)
20.

Plaintiff's expert witness, a CPA, never received

requested materials and relied upon Swensen's figure for
values regarding Defendant's business. (Record at 7, lines 7-20,
record at 16, lines 10-18, and record at 19, lines 20-25)
21.

Ms. Tanner has received some monies on a periodic basis

from Tanner, Inc., a family corporation. These disbursements have
occurred approximately five times in 19 years. The amounts have
varied. Ms. Tanner has generally received approximately $2,000 in
one year until several years ago when she received $8,000 two
years in succession. (Record at 50, lines 24-25, record at 51)
22.

Ms. Tanner received these two $8,000 amounts as a result

of the sale of a trading post business. (Record at 48, lines 18-23,
record at 50, lines 12-23)
Reply to Appellee Response
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23.

The two previous disbursements from Tanner Inc. were

$2,000 and $4,000 respectively. (Record at 49, lines 1-5)
24.

These disbursements were generally intended to cover Ms.

Tanner's allotted portion of the taxes for the family business.
(Record at 50)
25.

Ms. Tanner has been advised that she will not be

receiving any more lump sum payments as large as the amount of
$8,000 in the future by her father, Mr. Maurice Tanner, the
President of Tanner, Inc. Those larger $8,000 amounts accrued
solely as a result of the sale of the trading post business.
(Record at 50, lines 12-33)
26.

At trial, Plaintiff's counsel was not given the

opportunity to present a closing argument to make the court aware
of case law which pertained to the issues of fact and law before
the court, (Record at 192, lines 20-24)
27.

The trial court imputed income from sources no longer

available to Ms. Tanner.(Record at 50, lines 12-33)
28.

Ms. Tanner is planning to pursue a Ph.D. degree if

possible. Such training will require approximately 7 years (2 years
for the Masters' degree and an additional 5 years for the Ph.D.)
(Record at 99, lines 20-25, record at 100, line 1)
29.

Ms. Tanner was awarded alimony for 2 years (Transcript of

Reply to Appellee Response
Appellate Case. No. 940079-CA
Page 6

Judge's Ruling, pages 1 & 2)
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
The Standard of Review on Appeal is that the Appellate Court
must reverse if there is a misapplication or misunderstanding of
the law, if the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings
or conclusions or if there is a serious inequity that must be
rectified as set forth in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410
(Utah 1977) .
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

The division of the marital property was not equitable.

Newmever v, Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1987), stated that
"in determining whether a certain division of property is equitable
. . . the relative abilities of the spouses to support themselves
after the divorce are pertinent to an equitable...division of the
fixed assets of the marriage".
Ms. Tanner contends that in the division of the property, the
trial court did not take into consideration her special
circumstances, i.e., her relative lack of work experience, and her
full-time student status.
2.

The court accepted values of property not consistent with

the worth of the property if sold, causing an inequitable division
of property.
Reply to Appellee Response
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3.

The court's award of $700 per month alimony for a two-

year period is an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d
250, 214 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (1994).
4.

The court abused its discretion in imputing income from

Tanner, Inc., as well as income from teaching Art classes in the
summer as Ms. Tanner can no longer participate in that activity
because of her participation in year-round schooling. Savage v.
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, (S. Ct. 1983). Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d
408, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 78. Ms. Tanner provided an accurate figure
regarding income for the purposes of child support.
5.

Ms. Tanner's interest in Tanner, Inc. qualifies as a pre-

inheritance gift and the court abused it's discretion in utilizing
the family corporation in figuring child support and/or alimony,
as it was not income but a property interest.
A.

Ms. Tanner testified at trial that her brothers and
sisters also received similar disbursements to hers.

B.

That the Tanner family corporation has been in place for
approximately 35 years and it was in the form of preinheritance. (Record at 46, lines 16-21, record at 47,
line 11, and record at 47, lines 24-25). Typically,
inherited property will be awarded to the person who
inherited it, even when the property was inherited years
before the divorce.

C.

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Ut. 1987). If the
court should determine that Tanner, Inc., was not preinheritance, it would be forced to admit that the
Plaintiff's/Appellant's interest in the family
corporation property was premarital property, at the very
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least, an interest which had not been commingled into the
marital estate, and one that was not augmented and/or
maintained by the other spouse in any capacity. A court
must find unique circumstances that warrant disregarding
the general rule that premarital property is separate
property. Waiters v. Waiters, 812 P.2d 64 (Ut. App.
1989).
6.

The trial court abused its discretion in finding that Ms.

Tanner could earn $20,000 a year in two years, after she completed
her schooling. It presumed that she will indeed complete the
schooling, secure employment and earn that amount. Wiley v« Wiley,
227 Ut. Adv. Rep. 39 (1993), found such a finding improper.
7.

The court abused its discretion in not awarding

attorney's fees. Utah law provides that the award be based upon the
need of the party seeking the award, and reasonableness of the fee
sought. Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Ut. 1986). Sinclair v.
Sinclair, 718 P.2d 396 (Ut. 1986). Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117
(Ut. 1986). Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Ut. App.
1988) .
8.

The court abused its discretion in not allowing

Plaintiff's counsel to present argument and cases relevant to the
matter at bar in closing argument. Bunnell v. The Industrial
Commission of Utah. 740 P.2d 1331, 62 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (1987).
ARGUMENT
Appellee relies upon Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198
Reply to Appellee Response
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(Utah App 1992) , as authority in claiming that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in its division of the marital property.
In

Roberts.

as

in

distribution is an issue.

the

matter

at

hand,

the

property

The court clearly states that property

distribution must be based on adequate findings.

The Court defined

"adequate findings " in that opinion in its review of the custody
issue.

In cases tried by the bench, the court is required to find

the fact specifically and ground its decision on findings of fact
which resolve the material factual uncertainties and those findings
should

be expressed in enough detail to enable a reviewing court

to determine whether they are Utah R. Civ P. 52 (a) - "To ensure the
court acted within its broad discretion, the facts & reasons for
the courts decision must be set forth fully in appropriate Findings
and Conclusions."
appeal

These findings must be adequate to ensure on

that the trial

rationally based.

court's discretionary

determination

was

(Painter v. Painter 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Ut App

1988.)
Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P. 2d 78, 83, describes the

legal

standards applied by the appellate courts which are based on Utah
Code Ann Sec. 30-3-10(1) (1989) which requires the trial court to
be

a

guide

in

assessing

conclusions of law.

Reply to Appellee Response
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correctness,

not

merely

proceeding

The Findings should divine how the court

reached it's final legal conclusion.
In Roberts, as here, the wife also contested the nominal
alimony award.

As in Roberts, no where, in the findings did the

court make a specific analysis of the parties circumstances in
light of the Jones analysis,
[1]

needs of receiving spouse to produce sufficient income;

[2]

ability of receiving spouse to produce sufficient income;

[3]

ability of supporting spouse to provide support.

and

and

As in Roberts, this court did not make specific or adequate
findings on the parties relative needs, or make a comparison of
their relative abilities to provide support.
The Findings are clearly insufficient to give weight to the
court's judgement regarding property division and alimony.
In addition, the Appellee contends that this court must
examine the entire distribution of property and not reverse on any
isolated

item of property.

Naranyo 751 P. 2d At 1148.

The

Appellant agrees and encourages the court to review the broad sweep
of property division, attorney's fees, child support and alimony to
determine if the court has not shown prejudice against Appellant.
A clarification of the facts specified by Appellee might be
Reply to Appellee Response
Appellate Case, No. 9-40079-CA
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helpful in regards to the ruling of division of marital property in
this case, such as the fact that contrary to the Response brief,
Ms. Tanner's expert testified that he did have personal experience
in valuing a law firm (R-8-11) , not that he was inexperienced.
Mr. Swenson argues that in Finlayson v. Finlavson, 874 P.2d
843, 849 (Utah App 1994), there was dispute "regarding whether the
loan from husband's mother was actually an enforceable debt or
gift.

The court, however, clearly gives its basis of division in

that a trial abuses its discretion when it unilaterally allows one
party, the husband in this case, to use a large share of the liquid
assets to discharge debt. The court, here as well as in Finlavson,
should have equitably distributed the liquid assets.
Appellee argues that the financial declarations should not be
a basis for making a final award.

The financial declarations were

part of the record, the parties also testified regarding the
figures therein contained.

Certainly, they should be utilized in

a determination.
Appellee misstates when he alleges the marital home was
appraised by Ms. Tanner's own appraiser.

Indeed, the appraiser was

suggested by Mr Swenson.
Mr.

Swenson

includes the amount

discussion of Ms. Tanner's large award.
Reply to Appellee Response
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in Tanner

Inc.

in his

Tanner Inc. was clearly

pre-marital property and any review of those assets in relation to
the marital estate is clearly improper.
characterizes

Ms,

mischaracterization

Tanner's

disposable

Appellee improperly
income.

This

is evidenced again as Ms. Tanner received

monies from her family in her purchase of a computer and testified
she borrowed money from her father In enroll .nil pay for selfesteem training.

She did not pay for those things herself, as

evidenced by the record.
The court abused its discretion in imputing income.

i ontrary

to the characterization of the facts in Appellees Brief:
[1]

Ms. Tanner testified she would be receiving no further

large distributions from Tanner Inc.
come close to the $8,000 figure.

Certainly none that would

In fact, she clearly stated that

the large amount was a one time occurrence because of the sale of
a family owned Trading Post Business.
[2]

In

addition, because

of her

schooling, Ms. Tanner

testified she had not been teaching summer art classes nor did she
intend to continue to do so because her schooling went all year
round.
[3]

Ms. Tanner turther testified that any stipends she may

have received were not continuing.
Ms. Tanner also testified she expects to earn $20,000 if, in
Reply to Appellee Response
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fact, she completes her graduate program but she has not made
inquiries to determine whether that expectation is valid.
CONCLUSION
The Findings at trial in the instant case exemplify a pattern
abuse of discretion and prejudice against the Plaintiff in almost
every instance.
The parties have had a long-term marriage.

The Appellee is a

professional tax attorney and C.P.A.; the Appellant, primarily a
mother with little work experience, who presently is a full-time
graduate student. The court heard evidence that the Appellant had
not really worked since she put the Appellee through law school,
(almost 2 0 years ago) and yet the court ordered term alimony for
only two years.
In terms of the child support award, the court imputed the
Appellant income from summer art classes she testified she could no
longer participate in as well as from periodic pre-inheritance sums
of money, which Appellant testified

she would

not have any

significant access to in the future.
The court did not take into consideration the differences in
ability to produce income while making a division of the marital
assets.
Although, Ms. Tanner was not earning any income, the court
Reply to Appellee Response
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Page 14

awarded no attorney's fees and made a Finding that the Appellant
had not testified as to need which, in fact, was not consistent
with

the

record.

Appellant's

counsel

also

testified

as

to

reasonableness.
The Trial court refused to listen to closing argument and
directly

articulated

that

the

C O urt

was

not

interested

in

Appellant's rights.
Dated this 11th day of January, 1995.
RespectfulIv submitted,
Nebeker, McConkie & Wright
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Katnleen McConkie, Esq.
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